Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal
Issue 6

Article 5

5-1-1991

Leibniz — Beyond The Calculus
Hardy Grant
York College

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj
Part of the Intellectual History Commons, and the Mathematics Commons
Recommended Citation
Grant, Hardy (1991) "Leibniz — Beyond The Calculus," Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal: Iss. 6, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/hmnj/vol1/iss6/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

LEIBNIZ -

BEYOND THE CALCULUS
HarcJy Grant
York University

Leibn iz ligures in the sta ndard hist ories of mathematics mostly as sha ring , with Newton. the ma in credit
tortha first significant tcmutaucn of the calcu lus. That is
appropriate in the sens e tha t there indeed lay his most
vita l and endu ring co ntribution to the SUbject . But such a
focus limits co nooerably th e role of mathematics in
Lefbnu ' ow n life and thought. Mathematica l considerations also suggest ed . crystallized . governed in man y
pivotal wa ys the me taphysica l system that places him
among the West's sup re me philosophers. What follow s
is an attempt to ou lli ne some features of this broader
picture, to co rrect the sometime fragmentations in our
est imate of his work, to see his mathematical activity as
a who le.

We can not hope to understand him except against
the background of his age . In particular his famous (or
notorious) optimism , though doubtless grounded partly
in personal makeup, had discernible contemporary roots.
His unquestioning fa~h in the existence and supreme
benevolence of the God of Christianity mirrored a climate
in whic h atheism was widely equated less with wckeoness than with mere stupidity. He lived in the heady days
when the homely apparatus of the Royal Society's ~sooty
empirick s" promised to unlock the last secrets of nature,
and when his great rival Newton brought the universe
itseK under the sway of mathematical law. In his time
these advances in physical science, and many of the
g reat issues of ph ilosophy, remained close enough to
ccmrrcn modes 01 thought that many inquirers , Leibniz
among the m, co uld address the ir speculations to duchesses and king s - who occasionall y joined in the game.
It has been called the "Age of Reason" and the ~Age of
Ge nius ," but an equally valid tag would be the "Age of
Confidence." And of course much of the pervasive
euphoria was born 01 the visible power and promise of
math ematics , its application (as by Ga lileo and Newton)
to physical understandi ng , the co nv iction (as in Hobbes
and Spinoza) that its me thods could bring unprecedented
improvement in other fields . Not surprising then that
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Leibniz , himsel superbly skilled in mathematics and
steeped (as we sha ll see) in a view of the subject
calculated to encourage bold extrapclations . yielded to
no one in that exuberant age in his hopes both for the
tlJ man understanding of nature and tor the scientific
ame lioration of socia l ills.
He came relatively late in life to mathematics probably the latest "bloomer" among all the subjecl'S
most gifted creators. His formal education in mathematics was sUght and superficial ; his fundamental work on
the calculus awaited his historic sojourn in Paris (167276), that began when he was a lread y 26 years old . His
eartier training and preoccupations recall the biolog ists '
old notion that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny~ that the ind ividual's development retraces its species'
evolutionary course. For like the post-medieval western
mind in general, Leibniz came to an awareness of the
power and beauty of mathematics from an immersion in
the modes and vocabulary of scholasticism,behind which
in tum rested the gigantic figure of Aristotle ;.and Leibniz'
own philosophy retained this imprint to the end. But just
as E. T. Bell declared that the scholastic philosophers
were mathematicians msroues, so Lelbraz in his youth
groped instinctively toward mathematical forms and procedures that his education had not revealed to him . As
a teenager, he told a correspondent , he wondered
whether, ~si nce simple terms or concepts are ordered
through the known categories" (Aristotle's word for the
basic organizing concepts 01 all thinking), "one could not
set up categories and ordered series for ccrrelex terms
or truths as well . . . at that time I did not know that
mathematical demonstrations were what I was seeking .'" The triJmphs of his Paris phase "hooked" him
forever on mathemat ics, and his mature writings sing its
praises cou ntless time s. Mathematical stud ies . he declared in 1686 . have a twof old use and valu e. -partly as
an exarroe of more rigorous judgment, part ly for the
knowledge of harmony and the idea of beauty .-2 These
idea ls are of course Gree k; Le ibniZ tell in love w ith the
spirit 01He llenism a century ahead of its ' redecc verv -tcr
the German mind by Winckelmann , Less ing and Goethe.
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Greek too was leibniz' conception of the ontological
status, the "reality. of mathematical concepts and forms .
His unchallengeable place among the subject's "modern" creators has masked the fact that his ow n view of it
was profoundly trad itional. Mathematics was for him a
collection 01 timeless. necessary truths . These are
bind ing even on God , who (for example) could not, even
i1 he wished. create a triangle with an angle sum different
fro m 180 degrees.3 We reach the primary t ruths and
concepts 01 mathematics by observation, by induction,
and by the aid 01 the "natural light: that higher intuitive
facuhywhich Aristotle called nousandwhich l eibniz took
over from a European tradition ranging from Augustine to
Descartes. Thus mathematics , on this ancient view ,
describes an idealized but objective order, grounded in
our physical experience. In particular its axioms, so far
from being artl itrary, are exceptionally certain tnrtns .
which are in princ iple provable - and Leibniz himsef
undertook on at least fwc occasions to demonstrate lrom
still more basic asscrrotons the Euclidean postulate that
the whole is greaterthan the pan.4 One must stress aqain
that thi s whole conception of mathematics was standard
already in antiquit y, pa rt of the vast corpus of thought
COdified lor the western heritage by Aristotle and representing at bottom a kind of enormously intelligent and
deep iy reflective common sense .
R

It is true thai Leibniz. for his pan. stood near the
beginning of the eventual replacement of this traditiona l
view 01 mat hematics by another. That tremenc:lous
Change, the transition to a modern mat hematics far richer
and stranger but increasing ly divorced from experienced
reality and strippe d of its claim to absolute truth - nonEuclidean geometry is the central symbol - is surely the
pivotal watershed in all the subject' s long history, a
revolution much more profound even than the rise of
axiomatic and deductive methods in classic Gr eece. The
17th century deba te over the status of innnitesimals
formed one eptsooe in that historic passage. lor, as
Leibruz wrote ,these mysterious entitie s have no counterpan in "nature ," no validati ng presence incur experience.
His own response was in part pragmatic: the fruitful use
01 intirmesfmals in the calculus, he urged, does not
requ ire that these be "real," nor that the philosophical
dilemmas besetting them be resolved . But he grappled
with those dilemmas himself. and ended by seeing
infinitesimals as consistent wit h the ancient tradition of
mathematical realism. He linked them explicitly with
other rcveeieswhich conte rroorary mat hematicians were
contemplating with diverse degrees 01 uneasiness with imaginary numbers , with dimensions beyond the
third. with "powers whose exponents are not ordinary
(i.e., natural) numbers," Al lof these are usefu l "1:0 shonen
our reasoning ,~ and may indeed be essential. But they
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are not - he insisted tor example ,

merely

,/, +F3 +'/'

tctcns.

Demo nstrab ly,

-'/ - 3 .f6.

so that our use of imag inary numbers ult imately returns
to , is justified by , a Ioundancn in ob jective reali1 y
(fundamentum in 'e ): and so with our conceptions of the
infinite and 01 infinitesimals.s Thus even Leibniz' own
groundbreaking wor1<; in the calculus wrought no essenHalchange in his tradition-sanctioned vision of the Objective , Ptatorust character of mathematical ideas ,
And atter all, that same perspective was pre cisely
the necessary condition for the hopes of leibniz and
others who would extend the methods of mathematics to
other fields. The clarity 01 mathematical concept s
(infinitesimals notwithstanding), and the rigor of mat hematical demo nstrations, had be en pa radigmatic in
westem thought since Euclid. In Leibniz' mind mathematics joined with religious faith in fostering a ccrception of metaphysics and ethics as re alms of potentially
sure knowledge, of eternal truths underwritt en by God
and acc essible to human understanding, and therefore
as naturalcandidates lo r aJltivation-mo'e geometrico. But
like Thomas Hobbes (Who as a young man he much
admired) Leibniz regretted that the Euclidean method
had not yet bee n app lied with suffici ent zeal and subtlety
outs ide of its home domain - "we have d emonstrations
abou t the circle . but only cc niect u res about th e soul. ~ Al
one time in his life, he te lls us, he tried his own hand at
suc h metaphysical geom etry, in the loftie st of all spiritual
enqu iries, the study of God. "I often actu ally played the
mathemat ician in theo logy, inc ited by the novelty of the
role: I set up d elinitions and trie d to deduc e from them
certain elem ents which were not inferior to tho se of
Euclid in clarity but fa r exceeded them in the magnitude
of the ir ecnse cuerces.? In suc h philosophical adven tures, he fe lt, the strict deductive ch ains cha racteristic 01
geometry are not only possible and appropriate but vital,
lest deep and difficu h truths elude our reasoning. In lact
demonstrative rigor is actually more u rgent in metaphysics than in mathematics itsell , wh ere errors are easier to
det ect.8
Hence Leibniz ' lifelOng goal of a "universal charac teristic," a calculus that wouk:l allow the extension of
logical and matnematca! reasoning to other necs. He
took his cue, and his hopes . from contemporary algebra,
the still excitingly novel syrrbolic manipulations pioneered above all by Francois vtete. Wit hout that example , wrote leibniZ. he "couk:l hardly ha ve att ained" his
own more grandiose schemes,9 Algebra ind eed onerec
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the most "beautiful- existing example of the possibilities,
but Leibniz groped toward an -an of combinations-that
would far exceed algebra in power and applicability. He
had the modem insight that algebra is efTllty of content,
that any calcukJs is -nothing but operation through cnaracters" and hence can in principle be brought to bear in
very diverse spheres . H is -characteristic- would gener·
alize algebra in the sense in which, in geometry, the
concept of sim ilarity genera lizes the concept of equality;
it would be a universal science of lorms rather than
merely a calaJ lus of numbe rs and magnitudes. And just
as algebra operates on arbit rary letters of the alphabet,
so (Leibniz urged ) appropriate combinations and manipulations of letters can be made to mirror an human
thou ght . We can even hope to ca lculate , bytaUying such
combinations, 'the number of truths which men are able
to express ,- and hence 'tne size of a work which would
contain all possible human knowledge- 10 ; here again
speaks the authentiCvo ice of the Age of Confidence. The
universal charaCieristicwould replace contusion 01 thoug/'t
by clarity , and would allow reasoning as exact in metaphysics or morality as in mathematics. Hence it promised
to end fore ver the clash of differing opinions, the endless
and futile debates and disagreements, that had chrcnically plagUed ma nkind. Le ibniz had found a seductive
hint of this last benefit in the Aristotelian logic of his
scholastic training . Caught up in philosophical controversy with another scholar, -I proposed the syllogistic
form , which was agreeable to my opponent. We carried
the matter beyond the twelfth prosyltogism, and, from the
lime we began this , complaints ceased, and we understood each other, to the advantage of both sides: 11 But
a tu IIdevelopme ntat the arscombinatoria promised mJch
more, held out the hope that the parties to any dispute
whatever might be able to say merely -let us calculate,and all contention would be resolved.

II
It will be obvious that the sine qua non of such
optimism was the certainty that the areas of potential
dispute - metaphysics, polit ics. ethics, theology, Iaware, like mathematics itself, realms of necessary truth,
which need onl y be elucidated to convince. To the study
of such truths Leibniz otten returned . A proposition is
"necessary," by his definit ion, if its denial is (or enta ils) a
COntradiction. But bow . in practice , does one identif y
necessary propcsno ns as sucn? Leibniz' examples are
alwa ys stat ements 01 the sub ject-copula-predicate form
that dominates Aristote lian log ic -statements interpretable as COfTllaring the memberships of setsorthe ranges
of co ncepts. Aproposition is necessary inLeibniz' sense
if it can be "resolved." by analysis of its subject and
predicate, to an -ide ntity- -that is, a statement with the

HMN News/ene, #6

property that of the two sets or concepts involved in the
subjed and predicate respectively. one can be shown to
contain, by definition, the other. (For exampkt, the
statement "a red rose is a rose" is an identity in this
sense.) Leibniz more than once illustrated his technique
01 analyzing necessary propositions with a sentence like
-A duodenary number (i.e., one divisible by 12) is a
~atemary number" (i .e., one divisible by 4) . Interestingly , the passionate cnarroonot algebraic manipula tion
does not pro ve this withthe trivial eeserveucn that m.12n
imp'ies m-4(3n). but undertakes instead a cumbersome
dissection of the ungainly adjedives that define the
respective sets . A duodenary is (by definition) a 'binary
binary ternary," hence (by definition) a -quaternary ter nary ."hence aquatemary, -q. e. d.·12 ttistobenotedthat
-analysis- and (equiv alently) -resolution- are in this context technical tenns whose mean ings stem from the
mathematics and philosophy 01 c1assk: Greece : they
descroe the familiar problem-solving strategy that seeks
to reduce the co~x to the simple, the secondary to the
fundamental, the derived to the axiomaticaDy true.
Now propositions which are not necessary are said
by Leibniz to be ~cont ingent . - They are statements which
can be denied without contradiction, like '1..eibniz attended the University of Leipzg: The 17th century's
SCientific Revolution threw into sharp relief the philo·
sophical issues raised by the ubiquitous presence of
such contingent facts in everyday life. How could these
be reconciled with the deterministic world-view emerging
lromthe new physics? What sense could be made olthe
unnecessitated, of the apparently random and accidental, what scope remained for human choice and freedom,
in a world bound by mathematically provable -laws- (that
powerful metaphor!), in a dimate 01 thought that soon
would evoke the mechanistic philosophy proclaimed by
La Mettne, the cosmic predestinationism voiced by
Laplace? For his part Leibniz reached a justifICation of
cont ingency that could occur only to a mind profoundly
molded by mathematics. The resolution 01 necessaty
propositions, described above , can always be accomplished in a finite nusreer 01 steps . A contingent propo sition, by contrast, has the property (according to Leibniz)
that the same sort of analysis does not tenninate. Thus
a fun understanding of such proposilions is beyond
human capacity: we can nol perform the infinite sequence 01 redudions which alone would show that the
concept i.eibniz~ actually includes anendance at the
Unive rsity of Le ipzg . But God, on the other hand , can
take in the whole at this infinite act of analysis in. SO to
say , a single glance. LeibniZ' thought here reflects , no
doubt. the limitle ss powers ascrtled to God by Christian
tradition: but it echoes contemporary mathematics as
wen. We reca ll that in his time mathematicians were
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increasingly cc rrf crtable with the "colll'lete<f' infinite
that had so spooked the ir Greek predecessors-witness
Newton'S famous declaration that our reasoning is "nO
less sure" in the context of infinite series than when
applied to finite sums, though in the former case our
minds ca n not embrace a tl the terms . Human mathemat icians, wrote Leibniz in the same spirit , "even have
demonstrations about infinite series" ; how much more
readily, then , are "co nting ent or infinite truths subject to
the knowledge 01 God:13
But his study of contingent propositions drew on
mathematics in another and much more spectre way . He
found a wonderfully illuminating analogy in a celebrated
piece of anc ient geometry. The "Euclidean algorithm," in
Euclid's original conception (Elements, VII, 2), sought
the greatest common measure of two magnitudes by the
repeated subtraction 01 the smaller remaining magnitude
trom the larger, a process guaranteed to terminate if the
magnitudes are commensurable - it, to put the matter in
our terms though not in Euclid's, the ratio of the measures
01 the orig inal magnitudes is a rational .....mber. In the
case of two magnitudes which are notcommensurable who se ratio is, for us, irrational - the process of reciprocal subtraction does not terminate . This contrast became
lo r leibniz the OJide and touchstone of his distinction
between necessary and contingent propositions. The
subject and predicate in a necessary prcccsncn are (he
argued) like commensurable magnitudes, in thai the ir
shared range of reference, revealed by a finitary analysis, is like the magnitUdes' greatest common measure,
computed by the Euclidean algorithm; correspondingly,
contingent propositions resemble surds. leibniz conceded that the analogy is not perfect. for one can calculate the true (irrational) ratio 01 two incommensurable
magnit udes w ith arbitrarily sma ll error , whereas no such
narrowing of the gap between human and divine understand ing 01 cont ingent truths is possible. Nevertheless
he rejoiced in having discovered through rratnemau c s
the key to a ridd le "WhiCh had me perplexed for a long
time; lor I did not unde rstand how a predicate could be in
a subject and yet the prccosaon would not be a necessary one . But the knowledge of geometry and the
analysis of the infinite lit ttus light in me , so tnat I might
urcerstaro how notions too could be resotvedto infinity :1 4
In suChways - and more te l1 ingly, ce macs. than in
any otner minclof wh ich w e have record - mathematica l
ideas con Slantly informed and colored leibniz' enti re
vision of the world . Many other thinkers, of course , ha ve
drawn inspiration from the same source ; Aristotle, for
one, anticipated Leibni2; ' way of reaching at every turn for
mathematical illustrations of philosophical arguments ,
resorting naturally to the beSlfounded and most richly
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developed science of his age. But in Leibniz tJ"Ie transference of ideas went deeper. For his work on the calOJkJs
put him at the frontier of contertl>Orary advance, and he
brought from mathematics a technical knowledge and
soph iSlication, a grasp of precise and particular detail,
which he applied in philosophy with a specificity that
rema ins unique . We cannot know - perhaps leibniz
himself couki not have reconstructed - the full course of
this creative borrowing, the complex interplay of mathematical examples and their metaphysical analogues in
the final shaping of his thought. Sometimes, as in his
study 01 necessary and contingent propositions , mathematical ccnscerarcns might seem merely to have
provided him with a convenient model, that might be
imparted though deeply suggestive. But often, reading
him - and remembering always his imag e of mathematics as a ccuectcn of etemal truths, and of concepts
perceived with matchless clarity - one cannot resist the
feeling that he seized on certain 01 those ideas as nol
mere ly suggesting or confirming metaph ysical po ints but
as offering sure signpo sts to the very contours 01 existential possibility, the very scope and direction 01 God 's
creative design of the world.
It is fascinating to see how lTUchot his metaphysics
can be expounded in such terms. "In the very orig ination
of th ings," he wrote, "a certain Divine mathematics or
metaphysical mechanics is employed," wh ich ensured
the max imum production of all desirable things : we see
the same optimizing principle in the operalion of nature
even now , in (for example) the tact that "When several
heavy bodies are operating against one another, the
resull is that movement which secures the greatest
descent on the whole ."15 In the act 01 creation, said
Leibniz, God acted "like the greatest geometer, who
prefers the best constructions of problems." That is to
say, just as a geometer will seek a prool or construction
that combines maxirrom range and power w ith supreme
economy of argument, so God , in choos ing among the
infinitely many potential orders 01 existence , opled lor the
one which would yield ,he greatest effect- -the maximum of goodness and happiness - from 'tne simp lest
means: 16 leibniz lived too far in advance of sadd lepoint calcu lus - not to me ntion the mode m theo ry 01
games - to make rroCh mathematically of such "minimax" cons derato ns , but they remained bas ic to the
opt imist ic teno r 01his ph ilosophy. For onc e, indeed, the
catch-phrase thai has filtered 10 popular perception from
the complex thought of a great mind is who lly accurate :
leibniz reall y did believe that this is, strictly and absolutely , the best of all possible worlds - whence, 01
course, the brilliant , bitter mockery directed aga inst his
system by Vollaire.
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Further details of Leibniz' cosmic vision were bred or
reinforced by specific features of contemporary analytic
geometry and calculus - their achievements and their
limitations alike. To him the order detectable in the
universe was like the unity imposed on a plane curve by
a single algebraic expressionthat describes andgoverns
all its features. He seems to have shared with at least
some01 his fellow analysts a remarkably bullish sense of
the possibilities of OJrve-fitting; he related that Johann
Hudde claimed the ability to find an algebraic equivalent
for the profile of any human face, and LeibniZ himsell
agreed that this is possible.11 More strikingly still, he held
that, given any set of randomly scattered points in a
plane,one can find a curve "Whose notion is constant and
uniform,following a certain rule- - meaning, apparently.
the graph of a continuous lunction given everywhereby
a single formula - which not merely passes through all
the given points but does so in the order in whk:h they
were laid down. Similarty- and the analogyis of course
made fully explicit - God could fashion a harmonious
universe lrom any original chaos of potential existents.
for -no way of creating the world can be conceived which
is so disordered that it does not have its own fixed and
determinate order.-18
This mathematically sustained faith in the world's
uhimate rationality and goodness went further still. Undeniably. we seem to perceive many irregularities and
inequities in the physical and moral fabric of things.
Likewise (said Leibniz] every curve has points singularities. extrema, points 01 inUection -which seem
to stand out as different from the others. But in fact the
seemingly anomalous nature of such points is shown by
the new catcujus to follow from, to conform to, the
"equation or general nature of the whole- curve, which
thus remains, on a broader perspective, "perfectly ordered- after all; and similarly for the seeming imperfections in the world around us.19 And as in the universe as
a whole, so also in our individual lives. All the seemingly
exceptional eventsthat befall us, evenour verybirthsand
deaths, are only, as it were, peaks or valleys or cusps on
the trajectories of our immortal souls;they arenotoutside
theuniformity of nature, they violate no generallaws.20 In
one especially confident passage LelmiZ declared that
thewend'soverall perfectionobtains alsoin allitssmallest
componentparts- even as the shortest-descent property
01 the cycloid arc which solves the brachistochrone
problem holds between any two points, however close.21

As is well known, LeibniZ' philosophy is suffused by
a deep organicism, which saw each of the world's smallest pans as related to all of the others through constant
-intercourse- and rootual influence. It is an ideawhich, as
Joseph Needham urged, ecrcee more vividly the ChtHMN Newsletter16

nese sages whom Leibniz studied than the prevailingly
mechanistic outkx>k of contemporary Europe. But it
owed somelhing10 his mathematicstoo, We have seen
his belief that to any arbitraryset of points can be fitted a
curve "Whose notion is constantand unifomr (errcnasls
here added), LeibniZ scarcely knew - or at any rate
scarcely considered- discontinuousfunctions; and this
prevailing tendencyof his mathematics encouraged him
to find, everywhere in nature, continuouspassages from
one Slate of affairs to another, The "Law of Continuity"
became one of the most fruitful guiding principles of his
thought. Ellipses, parabolas and hyperbolas, for example, seemfrom-ex1emalshape-to be entirely different
from one another, yet we know that in fact each of these
passes into the others by gradations so "intimate- as to
bar the insertion of any different kind of curve in the
sequence. "Therefore: said LeibniZ, making one of his
grandest leaps,-Ithink I have good reasons forbelieving"
that in like manner all the world's endlessly varied spe ces 01organiccreatures form a singlecontinuouschain,
-like so many ordinates of the same [continuous~ curve
whose unity does not allow us to place some other
ordinates between two of them becausethat would be a
marie; of disorder and il'11>8r1ection."2Z This ladder of organic life isof coursethe "GreatChain of Being,- a staple
of the westernintellectual tradition sincethe timeof Plato
(and the subject, 'eng after Leibniz, of one of the most
absorbing and seminal books everwritten on the history
of ideas).23 Leibniz' tendency to find continuities everywhere assured him that "When the essential determinations of one being approximate those of another . . . all
the properties 01 the former should also gradually approximatethoseof the latter - or, aswe shouldsay, any
biological character is a continuous function of position
on the Chain. Certaincreatures with unusual traits,like
the 'zoophytes" that seemto bridge the plant and animal
kingdoms, maybe viewed as occupying,·so to say,- the
Chain's "regions of inflection orsingularity.-24 The Great
Chain of Being was hoary with antiquity when Leibniz
described it, bu1 never belore or since was it conceived
in such specifically mathematical terms,
Every particle of matter, said LeibniZ.teems with an
infinity of living creatures - a notionthat plausibly owed
much to the wonders discovered in his time. by
Leeuwenhoek and others, with the first microscopes. At
the very eenem 01 the organic hierarchy are the simple
soul-like substancesthat Lebniz called"mOnads.· Lebniz
usedmathematical ideaslnwrestlingwiththe notoriously
difficult problem of relaHng these elementary souls to
physical matter, Materiat bodies, he proposed. are
aggregates of these substancesin precisely theway that
geometricallines are aggregatesot points. A point, lhat
is to say, is not actually partol a line,10r -a part is always
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of the same natu re as the whole ;- rather, "a line in which
there is a poi nt is a part of a larger line, and similarly "a
soul is not a part 01 man er, but a body in which there is
such a soul issucnapan of maner.- 25 In leibniz'organicis1
vision of nat ure every monad, though absokJtely simple
and wit hOut pa rts, has nevenheess a I'nJltiplicity 01
relations with things out side itsetf , just as "in a center or
point, in itself perfectly silTflle, are found an infinity of
ang les formed by the line s which meet there.-26
ThiS surv ey of the mathematical bases of leibniz'
thought could be supplemented by other examples . But
no ca se is here made for the notion that the whole of his
philosophy is so describable . He would have been the
fi rst 10 scorn such a claim as grotesque , for in fact he
insisted repeatedly that much in nature is not 10 be
exp la ined by mathematics .27 The present account has
set aside , as net so palpably tied to mathematics, suc h
fu ndamental and cnaracrenstc of Leibniz' preoccupat io ns as the nature of substance, the relation of -efficie nt"
and "finar cau ses , the case for ilTVllOn ality, and many
more . I hope only to have shown that the role of
rnathematcs in shaping his philosophy was very considera ble , and thaI it too k surprisingly detailed, cruc ial and
SophiSlN:ated forms. This side of the great ph ilosopher
ha s been underappreciated - perhaps above all by
mathematicians. To speak 01 him merely as a co-founder
of the ca lculus is doubtless to set him correctly in the
history of techncal progress - but at the price of a limited
perspective on the whole man and on the splendid
originality and power of his thought .
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